Our cognitive abilities can only be expressed on the world through our actions. Here we review the computations underlying the way that the sensorimotor system converts both low-level sensory signals and high-level decisions into action, focusing on the behavioral evidence for the theoretical frameworks. We review recent work that determines how motor memories underlying sensorimotor learning are activated and protected from interference, the role of Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control including sources of suboptimality, the role of risk sensitivity in guiding action, and how rapid motor responses may underlie the robustness of the motor system to the vagaries of the world.
Although sensorimotor learning feels to us like a uni tary process, its study is often broken down into a number of interacting processes. Here we review several aspects of sensorimotor learning that have seen progress in recent years and focus on computational approaches that have been studied behaviorally in humans. We start by exam ining how motor memories for different skills are orga nized, focusing on the rules by which different motor memories are parcellated and accessed. We then focus on the issue of online control and trajectory generation reviewing the theory of optimal feedback control and behavioral tests of this theory. Finally, we focus on the interaction between decision-making and sensorimotor control, examining their bidirectional interaction.
MOTOR MEMORIES
Our ability to learn and store multiple motor skills underlies the extraordinary flexibility with which we can revisit old skills, tools, and environments. A great deal of effort has been expended in trying to understand the rules by which novel skills are parcellated, stored, and protected from interference but yet reactivated and amended as a particular task is reexperienced. The use of motor tasks that are in some sense opposite to each other and therefore interfere has been a powerful tool to study motor memories within the laboratory setting (Brashers-Krug et al. 1996; Krakauer et al. 1999; Karniel and Mussa-Ivaldi 2002; Caithness et al. 2004 ). For exam ple, robotic interfaces can be used to apply novel dynam ics on the arm by having a subject grasp a handle that generates forces on the hand that typically depend on the state of the hand. Using such devices one can, for exam ple, generate velocity-dependent forces that act at right angles to the direction of current motion-the so-called velocity-dependent curl field (Gandolfo et al. 1996) . Such a field can be applied in either a clockwise (CW) or a counterclockwise (CCW) direction. When experienc ing a single force field, subjects learn to compensate for the dynamics, reverting to the approximately straight-line movements with bell-shaped velocity profiles before the perturbation. However, if CW and CCW fields are inter mingled (either randomly or in batches) minimal learning is seen with such opposing force fields leading to strong interference. Even with contextual cues such as overlay ing color or a virtual tool whose features fully predict the direction of the force field, learning is at best modest (Howard et al. 2013 ). This suggests that such opposing skills tend to compete for the same motor memory.
Contextual Rules for Motor Memories
Recently, it has been shown that more dynamic features of a task can allow separate motor memories to form. For example, it is possible to learn opposing force fields in one arm if motion of the other arm ( present or absent) indicates the identity of the force field (Nozaki et al. 2006) or if the other arm makes concurrent and different movements for the two force fields . These results suggest that the coding of motor memories can depend on the conjunction of the movements of the two arms. Other features of movement can also be used to learn opposing perturbations. For example, if similar movements are made that are discrete or rhythmic, op posing perturbations can be learned when each is associ ated with a different type of movement . Separating the location of learning either proprio ceptively or visually also facilitates learning of opposing force fields (Hwang et al. 2006; Hirashima and Nozaki 2012; Howard et al. 2013) . Modeling approaches have suggested that such contextual effects arise from the en gagement of separate neural populations (Nozaki and Scott 2009) .
Recently, we have examined the effect of the lead-in to a movement. Although there was already evidence for some sequential effects on the ability to learn opposing (Wainscott et al. 2005 ), we examined a task in which we systematically varied the dwell time after a leadin to a movement that would then be made in a force field (Howard et al. 2012) . For example, the lead-in could be made from two different starting locations, followed by a single movement through either a CW or CCW force field. Critically the starting location was fully predictive of the force-field direction that would subsequently be experi enced. When subjects were required to dwell for 1000 msec after the lead-in movement before proceeding to the movement through the field, they were unable to learn to compensate for the opposing force fields when random ly interleaved. However, as the dwell time was reduced to ,500 msec, learning increased, and with minimal dwell time there was substantial learning. This suggests that the recent history (�500 msec) of the state of the arm before experiencing the field affects the currently active motor memory and the more different the history is the greater the ability to separate motor memories. Interestingly, this effect did not require active movement, as it was seen even if the hand was passively moved for the lead-in.
This effect of recent states on separating motor mem ories led us to explore whether this effect could poten tially explain the value of the follow-through in sports. Despite the fact that motion after contact or release with a ball cannot affect the flight of the ball, coaches have learned that the follow-through is important for skilled performance. We hypothesized that future actions that you plan to make might select current motor memories, and therefore different follow-throughs would preactivate distinct motor memories. We showed that it is possible to learn opposing force fields if the follow-through after the movement in the force field is different for each of the fields (Howard et al. 2015) . This suggests that the value of making a consistent follow-through is that it activates a single motor memory leading to faster learning. We con firmed this by showing that when learning a single force field, learning is faster if a consistent follow-through is made after each movement through the field compared with when the follow-through is variable across trials. This gives a new interpretation to the value of the follow-through, that rather being specified so that you can optimize planning it may in fact optimize the learning. The neural underpinning of such follow-through effects is not known. However, potential future motor plans will certainly affect neural activity (Cisek and Kalaska 2005) so that different follow-throughs may directly engage separate neural populations that lead to the generation of movement. An alternative, but complementary per spective is that by viewing motor generation as a dynam ical system of interacting neurons (Churchland et al. 2012 ) different follow-throughs will require different ini tial states of the dynamical system, each of which could be associated with the different force fields.
Structural Learning
Rather than using cues to allow distinct memories to be learned, we have shown that experiencing a variable per turbation increases our ability to learn a new perturbation that comes from the same structure but not from other structures (Braun et al. 2009; Turnham et al. 2012) . For example, having experienced visuomotor rotations drawn uniformly from 290˚ to þ90˚, subjects can then readily learn a fixed þ60˚ rotation and show minimal interfer ence when they transition to a 260˚ rotation. We pro posed that this ability depends on learning the structure, for example, of rotations. Two recent studies have sug gested a more mechanistic explanation for the ability to learn from random experience. One suggests that such learning simply leads to increasing error sensitivity glob ally (Herzfeld et al. 2014) , whereas the other suggests that we learn the appropriate weights for primitives (for the set of visuomotor errors we might experience) and that these are activated by prospective ( predicted) errors (Takiyama et al. 2015) . However, currently there are two issues that these models fail to address, which leaves the question of structural learning open. First, the models already assume the structure such as rotations in the underlying model so half the problem is effectively pre solved. More troublesome is that the ability to generalize critically depends not on simply experiencing errors that correlate across trials (both models require this) but that the structure be consistent. We found no increased learn ing of visuomotor rotations when subjects experienced a range of linear visuomotor transformations that includes rotations, shearing, and scalings (Braun et al. 2009 ). Sim ilarly, for groups of subjects exposed to random shearing or to random scalings, we found facilitation for shearing and scalings, respectively. Several other groups have also provided evidence that the structure of tasks is learned and used to appropriately make feedback and feed-for ward adjustments (Yousif and Diedrichsen 2012) and that the degree to which tasks share similar structures deter mines the ability of people to generalize between them (Ranganathan et al. 2014 ).
Tool Use
Although learning of force fields and arbitrary visuo motor perturbations has led to a great deal of understand ing, it may not reflect most of the learning we perform as adults. That is because although we need to learn the dynamics of our arms or of tools we interact with, similar to force-field learning, this may happen early in life. As an adult we might expect to have rather good structural models of how arms, hammers, and bicycles behave, and what we have to learn is the particular parameters of these such as length, mass, and friction. We have proposed that in naturalistic settings , such as when you operate on a tool such as a hammer, using vision you can estimate the structure of the task (assuming you have experience with hammers) but what you lack is precise knowledge of the parameters of the hammer (mass, density distributions, etc.). Consis tent with this is that when you operate on a virtual ham mer (e.g., rotating it at the handle), the forces that you generate even before any experience of the dynamics is in the correct direction to compensate for the forces induced on the handle by visual motion of the hammer head but for an estimated magnitude (Ingram et al. , 2013 . Learning requires adaptation of the magnitude across tri als. Such magnitude learning appears to be local to the orientation of the handle in the hand, suggesting that learning of parameters of tools, unlike the structure, is grasp-specific rather than holistic. Consistent with a qual itative difference between these situations is the different time course of learning for force fields compared with more naturalistic learning with tools, with the former an interaction of two processes (a fast and slow) ) and the latter mediated by a single process .
ONLINE CONTROL
Our actions are undoubtably variable in that even if we wish to make the same movement repeatedly, we clearly have some variability that cannot be fully controlled. There is currently a debate as to the source of such variability, with different proponents suggesting that substantial variability can arise from sensory noise (Os borne et al. 2005) , from suboptimal computation (Beck et al. 2012) , or from motor noise (van Beers 2007; Faisal et al. 2008; Chaisanguanthum et al. 2014 ). However, even if only a proportion of variability arises from motor noise, it still places a premium on planning movement so as to reduce this component of variability, and current models of trajectory control place an emphasis on minimizing costs, which are a mixture of energy and accuracy (for review, see Scott 2012) . Such models fall within the framework of optimal feedback control (OFC; Todorov and Jordan 2002; Diedrichsen et al. 2010) , which sug gests that people do not plan desired trajectories but in stead generate time-dependent feedback controllers with the aim of minimizing the movement cost in the presence of potential disturbances. A number of studies have con firmed predictions of OFC in terms of the task-dependent corrections that it predicts (e.g., Diedrichsen 2007; White and Diedrichsen 2010) . In addition, the framework of OFC has placed reflexes, or rapid motor responses, at the center of online control, as these reflect the feedback gains and OFC proposes that these should be highly tuned to the task at hand.
Rapid Motor Responses
Several studies have shown elegantly that many rapid motor responses are highly tuned to task demands (Kurt zer et al. 2008; Pruszynski et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2011; Pruszynski and Scott 2012) . We have further explored task-dependent reflex tuning and found that both visuo motor and stretch reflexes are highly modifiable by task demands. For example, the visuomotor reflex can be both up-regulated and down-regulated when visuomotor per turbations are task-relevant or task-irrelevant, respective ly (Franklin and Wolpert 2008) . Moreover, even at the same point within a movement, the visuomotor reflex gain can be regulated to respond differently for leftward or rightward displacements relative to the movement di rection ). Indeed such up-regulation of visuomotor gains is also seen under the initial period of learning dynamic perturbations . Such feedback gains can also be examined over the course of a movement and show a time-dependent mod ulation through the movement that is qualitatively in agreement with predictions of OFC (Dimitriou et al. 2013) . Moreover, these gains can adapt within a move ment to changes in task demands such as target jumps within 100 msec. Taken together, studies of reflexes with in a limb show a level of sophistication that suggests a good match to task demands.
Recently reflexes between limbs have been studied and these show that stretch reflexes between the limbs are also modifiable by task demands (Dimitriou et al. 2012; Omrani et al. 2013 ). Consider holding a tray with both hands that needs to be maintained level. Vertical pertur bations of one hand can be compensated by both reflex responses in the opposite direction to the perturbation in that arm or a response in the same direction in the other arm, both of these will restore the level of the tray. How ever, if both hands are perturbed vertically in the same direction then there is less need for reflex responses and conversely when they are perturbed in opposite direction reflex responses are needed in both arms. We examined just such a situation in which we could perturb one arm or both arms in the same or opposite direction and examined the rapid motor response (through electromyography [EMG] activity) and found clear task-dependent tuning of reflexes modulated online within a single trial based on the interaction across the arms and the nature of the per turbation (Dimitriou et al. 2012 ).
Risk Sensitivity
In general, optimal feedback control suggests that what we care about is the expected, or average, cost of the movement. Recently, we have examined the extent to which the variance of the cost is also important to sub jects (for review, see Braun et al. 2011) . Theories of risk sensitivity posit that the cost is a trade-off between the mean cost and variance, with those who are willing to accept a higher cost to either reduce variance or increase variance being risk-averse or risk-seeking. In a series of sensorimotor tasks we have shown that indeed subjects are often risk-averse or risk-seeking and do not simply optimize the expected reward (Nagengast et al. 2010 (Nagengast et al. , 2011a .
DECISION-MAKING AND SENSORIMOTOR CONTROL
Both decision-making and motor control require acting in real time on streams of noisy evidence. Thus both rely on inference, termination rules, time constraints, and value/effort costs. Up to now, these two fields have evolved in parallel. Decision-making has focused on complex streams of evidence from the environment but simple, ballistic movements. Conversely, motor control has fo cused on complex control problems but relatively sim ple stimuli. Both fields have computational frameworks that underpin them. Decision-making has benefited from the framework of bounded evidence accumulation (e.g., drift-diffusion models) whereby a stream of noisy in formation is integrated to a threshold, which terminates the decision and establishes the choice outcome (for re view, see Shadlen and Kiani 2013) . This framework can explain both the timing and the accuracy of behavior al decisions and is supported by a wealth of physiology. Sensorimotor control has benefited from a mathematical framework of optimal feedback control, whereby costs associated with accuracy and effort are combined to pro duce a time-varying feedback controller. Bayesian deci sion theory has rapidly become a unifying framework in which to understand how sensorimotor processes deal with uncertainty to make inferences, make decisions, and generate actions.
Bayesian Decision Theory
Key to this framework is that humans learn priors (i.e., the statistical distribution) for tasks they need to perform. Many studies have shown that when a prior is experimen tally placed upon a task subjects tend to learn the prior and use it in Bayesian way (e.g., Adams et al. 2004; Körding and Wolpert 2004) . However, this is true only for simple priors such as Gaussians, and people have much more trouble learning complex priors, at least in a laboratory setting. To examine the sources of such suboptimality we examined whether it was the learning of the prior or the use of the prior that was limited. Subjects performed a Bayesian integration task in which the prior was explicitly presented and therefore did not need to be learned (Acerbi et al. 2014) . Our results suggest subopti mality may be primarily due to a problem of acquiring the priors rather than computing with them.
Rather than applying priors it is possible to try to infer the subjects' natural priors, although such examination has until recently been limited to rather simple represen tations of the prior (Weiss et al. 2002; Turnham et al. 2011) . We have recently developed a new method, termed cognitive tomography, which takes simple low-dimen sional responses from subjects to calculate high-dimen sional priors (Houlsby et al. 2013) . As an example, we applied this method to the prior over the physical struc ture of faces by asking subjects to perform two different tasks. In one task they were presented with computergenerated pairs of faces and had to respond as to which face was more familiar, and in a second task they saw three faces and had to select which face they regarded as the odd one out. Given a generative model of these tasks we could infer each participant's subjective prior over the structure of faces (represented in the first two principal components of facial structure). We found that the priors were complex (not simply Gaussian) and varied widely across participants yet were very similar within each par ticipant across the tasks. Moreover, we could use the prior extracted from one task to predict the performance on the other task. These results provide support for the ideas that there is a single high-dimensional prior for faces that guides behavior in multiple tasks.
In general, we tend to perceive our own actions differ ently to how we perceive actions of others, and most people overrate their ability to drive (most people rate themselves as above average). Recently we have exam ined whether the prior we have for our own actions are the same as priors for other agent's actions (Wolpe et al. 2014) . We found that when performing an action our selves we tend to have a prior for errors that is narrower than our true error distribution, leading to us perceiving our own performance as better than it really is. In con trast, when we watch another agent perform the same task (in fact our own movements played back to us) the prior now matches our error distribution leading to veridical perception. This suggests that in a simple sensorimotor task overoptimism may arise from our subjective prior being narrower than it should be.
Bidirectional Interplay of Decisions and Control
To examine the relation between high-level decisionmaking and sensorimotor control we used a task in which we could estimate both the evolving decision variable (from drift-diffusion models) and stretch reflex (from OFC) to relate these before a decision was made. The question we addressed is whether decision-making and motor control are a sequential process, accumulation to a bound followed by motor preparation and action, or whether there could be a more continuous flow from the decision process to the motor system. To do this, subjects were required to make a decision of the direction of motion of a random dot kinematogram and indicate the direction by an elbow flexion or extension movement when the display was extinguished (Selen et al. 2012) . At the moment the display was extinguished a robotic device rapidly extended the elbow, setting up a stretch reflex whose magnitude could be measured using EMG. By varying the stimulus duration and difficulty (motion coherence) and fitting a model to the behavioral perfor mance we could estimate the decision variable on each trial and relate this to the magnitude of the stretch reflex. We found that the stretch reflex tracked the evolving de cision variable from even the smallest amounts of infor mation, suggesting a continuous flow from the decision process (even before a decision has been made) to the motor system, allowing the motor system to pretune its reflexes so as to get to the appropriate target faster.
Such online interactions between the decision and mo tor systems can also be seen in a change-of-mind phe nomenon. We examined subjects performing a simple motion direction discrimination task in which they had to indicate their decision (leftward versus rightward mo tion) by reaching to one of two choice targets (Resulaj et al. 2009 ). On initiation of the movement the stimulus was extinguished. Nevertheless, on a proportion of trials sub jects appeared to change their mind, reaching initially for one target before deviating to the other. Such changes of mind improved performance even though the stimulus was extinguished. A consideration of the time delays in the sensory, motor, and decision process suggests that even though the stimulus is absent there is further infor � mation on the processing pipeline ( 350 msec) that could be accumulated during the movement. We account ed for the pattern of the changes of mind with a simple model that assumed that after reaching a bound to make the initial decision, if a change-of-mind bound is then reached (on the opposite side of zero from the original bound but not requiring as much evidence as for the initial decision), then subjects will change their initial decision. Moreover, we and others have shown that the placement of this change-of-mind bound is dependent on the physical effort required to change one's mind (Burk et al. 2014; Moher and Song 2014) . For example, more evidence is required to change one's mind if the choice targets are widely separated compared with when they are close together.
CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed several aspects of sensorimotor control from motor memories underlying learning, online control, and the interaction of decision-making and control. Several themes have started to emerge within the field. First, the field of sensorimotor control is making links to others fields such as decision-making, working memory (e.g., Ma et al. 2014) , and explicit and implicit processes (e.g., Taylor et al. 2014; Trewartha et al. 2014) , and such links are likely to become increasingly impor tant. Second, new theories are starting to emerge that can be tested on increasingly large sets of experimental data (e.g., Takiyama et al. 2015) , and this is likely to provide an important framework for future theory devel opment. Finally, as the behavioral theories develop, they are able to make increasingly important links to neuro physiological data (e.g., Azim et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 2014) .
